feat: add Role and fromByte

src/auth.zig

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+const std = @import("std");
+const dbmod = @import("db.zig");
+
+const Allocator = std.mem.Allocator;
+const Db = dbmod.Db;
+const Hmac256 = std.crypto.auth.hmac.sha2.HmacSha256;
+
+/// Username/password authentication and coarse-grained role authorization,
+/// layered over the same Db as tables/indexes/collections under its own
+/// namespace tag 'A' (row.zig/index.zig use 'R'/'I'/'M', collections.zig
+/// uses 'X', so no keyspace ever collides):
+///   "A" "U\0" username -> UserRecord{role, rounds, salt[16], hash[32]}
+/// Passwords are never stored: only a per-user salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
+/// hash, using `std.crypto.pwhash.pbkdf2` - the same primitive the standard
+/// library itself ships for exactly this purpose, not a hand-rolled one.
+pub const nsTag: u8 = 'A';
+const userPrefixBytes = [_]u8{ nsTag, 'U', 0 };
+const saltLen = 16;
+const hashLen = 32;
+const recordLen = 1 + 4 + saltLen + hashLen;
+
+pub const AuthError = error{
+    UserNotFound,
+    UserExists,
+    InvalidCredentials,
+    Malformed,
+};
+
+/// Roles form a total order, not a set of independent flags: readwrite
+/// implies readonly, admin implies both. `atLeast` is the only check any
+/// caller (server.zig's dispatch) ever needs.
+pub const Role = enum(u8) {
+    readonly = 0,
+    readwrite = 1,
+    admin = 2,
+
+    pub fn fromByte(b: u8) !Role {
+        return std.meta.intToEnum(Role, b) catch error.Malformed;
+    }
+
+    pub fn parse(text: []const u8) !Role {
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, text, "readonly")) return .readonly;
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, text, "readwrite")) return .readwrite;
+        if (std.mem.eql(u8, text, "admin")) return .admin;
+        return error.Malformed;
+    }
+
+    pub fn name(self: Role) []const u8 {
+        return switch (self) {
+            .readonly => "readonly",
+            .readwrite => "readwrite",
+            .admin => "admin",
+        };
+    }
+
+    pub fn atLeast(self: Role, min: Role) bool {
+        return @intFromEnum(self) >= @intFromEnum(min);
+    }
+};
+
+/// Recommended real-world cost factor for interactive login (OWASP's floor
+/// for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 as of 2023). A constant rather than a value
+/// baked into `hashPassword` so tests can pass a tiny round count and stay
+/// fast, while `main.zig` and any other real caller default to this.
+pub const recommendedRounds: u32 = 100_000;
+
+fn userKey(allocator: Allocator, username: []const u8) ![]u8 {
+    const out = try allocator.alloc(u8, userPrefixBytes.len + username.len);
+    @memcpy(out[0..userPrefixBytes.len], &userPrefixBytes);
+    @memcpy(out[userPrefixBytes.len..], username);
+    return out;
+}
+
+const UserRecord = struct {
+    role: Role,
+    rounds: u32,
+    salt: [saltLen]u8,
+    hash: [hashLen]u8,
+
+    fn encode(self: UserRecord) [recordLen]u8 {
+        var out: [recordLen]u8 = undefined;
+        out[0] = @intFromEnum(self.role);
+        std.mem.writeInt(u32, out[1..5], self.rounds, .little);
+        @memcpy(out[5 .. 5 + saltLen], &self.salt);
+        @memcpy(out[5 + saltLen .. recordLen], &self.hash);
+        return out;
+    }
+
+    fn decode(data: []const u8) !UserRecord {
+        if (data.len != recordLen) return error.Malformed;
+        var rec: UserRecord = undefined;
+        rec.role = try Role.fromByte(data[0]);
+        rec.rounds = std.mem.readInt(u32, data[1..5], .little);
+        @memcpy(&rec.salt, data[5 .. 5 + saltLen]);
+        @memcpy(&rec.hash, data[5 + saltLen .. recordLen]);
+        return rec;
+    }
+};
+
+fn randomSalt() [saltLen]u8 {
+    var salt: [saltLen]u8 = undefined;
+    std.crypto.random.bytes(&salt);
+    return salt;
+}
+
+fn hashPassword(password: []const u8, salt: [saltLen]u8, rounds: u32) ![hashLen]u8 {
+    var out: [hashLen]u8 = undefined;
+    try std.crypto.pwhash.pbkdf2(&out, password, &salt, rounds, Hmac256);
+    return out;
+}
+
+/// Fixed salt/rounds used to cost a lookup against a username that does not
+/// exist, so `verify` spends roughly the same CPU whether the account is
+/// missing or the password was merely wrong - closing the most obvious
+/// timing side channel for username enumeration over the network (the
+/// key comparison itself still only runs on the "user exists" path, since
+/// there is nothing real to compare against otherwise).
+const dummySalt = [_]u8{0} ** saltLen;
+const dummyRounds: u32 = 4096;
+
+pub const UserInfo = struct {
+    username: []u8,
+    role: Role,
+
+    pub fn deinit(self: UserInfo, allocator: Allocator) void {
+        allocator.free(self.username);
+    }
+};
+
+pub fn freeUserList(allocator: Allocator, users: []UserInfo) void {
+    for (users) |u| u.deinit(allocator);
+    allocator.free(users);
+}
+
+/// Username/password/role management layered over a `*Db`. Every method
+/// touches only keys under `userPrefixBytes`; unrelated data in the same
+/// Db (tables, collections, raw KV) is never read or written. Not
+/// synchronized on its own, same as every other module built over Db -
+/// server.zig serializes access with its own connection-handling mutex.
+pub const Store = struct {
+    db: *Db,
+
+    pub fn init(db: *Db) Store {
+        return .{ .db = db };
+    }
+
+    pub fn createUser(self: Store, allocator: Allocator, username: []const u8, password: []const u8, role: Role, rounds: u32) !void {
+        const key = try userKey(allocator, username);
+        defer allocator.free(key);
+        if (try self.db.get(allocator, key)) |existing| {
+            allocator.free(existing);
+            return error.UserExists;
+        }
+        const salt = randomSalt();
+        const record = UserRecord{
+            .role = role,
+            .rounds = rounds,
+            .salt = salt,
+            .hash = try hashPassword(password, salt, rounds),
+        };
+        const encoded = record.encode();
+        try self.db.put(key, &encoded);
+    }
+