From 6f07fe8429b10ea64f7076aa1df02b5854377093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: DualFroz <me@dualfroz.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 21:27:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] test: strengthen tests for shellTest

---
 src/shellTest.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 158 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/shellTest.c b/src/shellTest.c
index 2dc2f89..30d8db7 100644
--- a/src/shellTest.c
+++ b/src/shellTest.c
@@ -464,3 +464,161 @@ KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsDanglingErrOperatorFailsWithoutMutating)
     KT_STREQ(t, argv[2], "2>");
 }
 
+/* `<<<` (here-string) is a third, independent fd-0 operator alongside `<` --
+   covered on its own (basic recognition, combined with real args and `>`,
+   dangling), plus the two last-one-wins cases proving `<` and `<<<` share
+   ownership of the SAME fd 0 (whichever comes later in the line wins,
+   clearing the other field entirely) rather than being two unrelated
+   fields a caller could accidentally read both of at once. */
+
+KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsHereStringBasic)
+{
+    char text[] = "cat <<< hello";
+    char* argv[8];
+    int argc = shellTokenize(text, argv, 8);
+    ShellRedirect redirect;
+    bool ok = shellExtractRedirects(argv, &argc, &redirect);
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_EQ(t, argc, 1);
+    KT_STREQ(t, argv[0], "cat");
+    KT_STREQ(t, redirect.hereString, "hello");
+    KT_NULL(t, redirect.inPath);
+}
+
+KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsHereStringWithRealArgsAndOutput)
+{
+    char text[] = "sort -r <<< hello > out.txt";
+    char* argv[8];
+    int argc = shellTokenize(text, argv, 8);
+    ShellRedirect redirect;
+    bool ok = shellExtractRedirects(argv, &argc, &redirect);
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_EQ(t, argc, 2);
+    KT_STREQ(t, argv[0], "sort");
+    KT_STREQ(t, argv[1], "-r");
+    KT_STREQ(t, redirect.hereString, "hello");
+    KT_STREQ(t, redirect.outPath, "out.txt");
+    KT_NULL(t, redirect.inPath);
+}
+
+KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsDanglingHereStringFailsWithoutMutating)
+{
+    char text[] = "cat <<<";
+    char* argv[8];
+    int argc = shellTokenize(text, argv, 8);
+    int originalArgc = argc;
+    ShellRedirect redirect;
+    bool ok = shellExtractRedirects(argv, &argc, &redirect);
+    KT_FALSE(t, ok);
+    KT_EQ(t, argc, originalArgc);
+    KT_STREQ(t, argv[0], "cat");
+    KT_STREQ(t, argv[1], "<<<");
+}
+
+KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsHereStringAfterFileRedirectWins)
+{
+    char text[] = "cat < a.txt <<< b";
+    char* argv[8];
+    int argc = shellTokenize(text, argv, 8);
+    ShellRedirect redirect;
+    bool ok = shellExtractRedirects(argv, &argc, &redirect);
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_EQ(t, argc, 1);
+    KT_STREQ(t, redirect.hereString, "b");
+    KT_NULL(t, redirect.inPath);
+}
+
+KTEST(shellExtractRedirectsFileRedirectAfterHereStringWins)
+{
+    char text[] = "cat <<< b < a.txt";
+    char* argv[8];
+    int argc = shellTokenize(text, argv, 8);
+    ShellRedirect redirect;
+    bool ok = shellExtractRedirects(argv, &argc, &redirect);
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_EQ(t, argc, 1);
+    KT_STREQ(t, redirect.inPath, "a.txt");
+    KT_NULL(t, redirect.hereString);
+}
+
+/* shellParseVarRef (shell.c) is the pure-syntax half of the shell's new
+   `$NAME` unquoted parameter expansion -- recognizing the "$" + name-chars
+   shape, never touching sched.h's Thread.env (that lookup is
+   shellExpandArgv's job, not KTEST-able here for the same pre-scheduler
+   reason shellTokenize's own file comment gives). */
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefAcceptsPlainName)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    bool ok = shellParseVarRef("$HOME", name, sizeof(name));
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_STREQ(t, name, "HOME");
+}
+
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefAcceptsDigitsAndUnderscore)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    bool ok = shellParseVarRef("$_var_2", name, sizeof(name));
+    KT_TRUE(t, ok);
+    KT_STREQ(t, name, "_var_2");
+}
+
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefRejectsBareDollarSign)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("$", name, sizeof(name)));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefRejectsTokenWithoutLeadingDollar)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("HOME", name, sizeof(name)));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefRejectsEmbeddedPunctuation)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("$FOO=bar", name, sizeof(name)));
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("$FOO/bar", name, sizeof(name)));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefRejectsNameTooLongForCapacity)
+{
+    char name[4];
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("$TOOLONG", name, sizeof(name)));
+}
+
+/* shellParseVarRef must never accept `$?` itself -- '?' is not in its own
+   [A-Za-z0-9_] name-character set -- so the two token classes
+   (shellIsStatusVarToken below and shellParseVarRef above) can never
+   both claim the same token. */
+KTEST(shellParseVarRefRejectsQuestionMark)
+{
+    char name[16];
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellParseVarRef("$?", name, sizeof(name)));
+}
+
+/* shellIsStatusVarToken (shell.c) is the pure-syntax half of the shell's
+   new `$?` special parameter -- recognizing the EXACT two-character token
+   "$?", never touching this file's own file-scope `lastStatus` (that
+   substitution is shellExpandToken's job, not KTEST-able here for the
+   same pre-scheduler reason shellExpandArgv's own env lookups are not). */
+KTEST(shellIsStatusVarTokenAcceptsExactMatch)
+{
+    KT_TRUE(t, shellIsStatusVarToken("$?"));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellIsStatusVarTokenRejectsBareDollarSign)
+{
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellIsStatusVarToken("$"));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellIsStatusVarTokenRejectsBareQuestionMark)
+{
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellIsStatusVarToken("?"));
+}
+
+KTEST(shellIsStatusVarTokenRejectsTrailingGarbage)
+{
+    KT_FALSE(t, shellIsStatusVarToken("$?x"));
+}
+