feat: wire up cookie_from and csrf_token_from
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# Runs ONE phase of the encryption key rotation lifecycle against
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# examples/blog, over a real HTTP request cycle. Always invoked as a brand
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# new `ruby` process by blog_rotation_demo.rb (never required directly) -
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# Prism::Orm::Encryption derives and caches each model's encryption key
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# once per class per process (see encryption_key_for), so genuinely retiring
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# an old secret and adopting a new one needs a fresh process with fresh ENV,
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# not just a different in-process config call.
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$LOAD_PATH.unshift(File.expand_path('lib', __dir__))
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require 'prism'
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require 'net/http'
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require_relative 'examples/blog/app'
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V1_SECRET = 'blog-demo-encryption-secret-v1'.freeze
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V2_SECRET = 'blog-demo-encryption-secret-v2'.freeze
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EMAIL = 'rotation@example.com'.freeze
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EMAIL_AFTER_UPDATE = 'rotation-updated@example.com'.freeze
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PASSWORD = 'correct horse battery staple v2'.freeze
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EMAIL_SALT = 'prism-orm-encryption/users/email'.freeze
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# A second row provisioned alongside the first but NEVER re-saved during
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# the transition window (no login, no account update in 'rotate_and_login')
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# - the realistic case of a row an operator forgot about, or a user who
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# simply never signs back in before the cutover deadline. Same password
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# for both so post_rotation_final's failing login attempt is unambiguously
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# about the ciphertext, not a typo'd credential.
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STRANDED_EMAIL = 'stranded@example.com'.freeze
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def cookie_from(response)
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lines = response.get_fields('set-cookie') || []
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lines.map { |line| line.split(';').first }.join('; ')
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end
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def csrf_token_from(html)
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html[/name="csrf-token" content="([^"]+)"/, 1]
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end
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# Independent of anything User/Encryption has cached in this process -
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# derives a key straight from a raw secret and tries to decrypt with it,
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# so a phase can prove exactly WHICH secret a given row's ciphertext is
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# really tied to, not just that "some configured key" happens to work.
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def decrypts_under?(secret, ciphertext)
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key = Prism::MessageEncryptor.derive_key(secret, salt: EMAIL_SALT)
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Prism::Orm::Encryption.decrypt(key, ciphertext)
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rescue Prism::Orm::Encryption::Error
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nil
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end
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phase = ARGV[0]
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server = Prism::Server.new(Blog, port: 0).start
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port = server.port
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case phase
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when 'signup'
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Net::HTTP.start('127.0.0.1', port) do |http|
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home = http.get('/')
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cookie = cookie_from(home)
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token = csrf_token_from(home.body)
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body = URI.encode_www_form(
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'user[email]' => EMAIL, 'user[password]' => PASSWORD,
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'user[password_confirmation]' => PASSWORD, 'authenticity_token' => token
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)
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signup = http.post('/users', body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected sign-up to redirect, got #{signup.code}" unless signup.code == '302'
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user = User.find_by(email: EMAIL)
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raise 'expected to find the freshly signed-up user by plaintext email under the v1 key' unless user
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row = Prism::Orm.store.find(:users, user.id)
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ciphertext = row['email']
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raise 'expected users.email to be stored encrypted, not plaintext' if ciphertext == EMAIL
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v1_plaintext = decrypts_under?(V1_SECRET, ciphertext)
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raise "expected the row to decrypt under v1, got #{v1_plaintext.inspect}" unless v1_plaintext == EMAIL
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raise 'expected the row NOT to decrypt under v2 yet (never encrypted with it)' if decrypts_under?(V2_SECRET, ciphertext)
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puts 'signup: user provisioned, email ciphertext independently confirmed tied to the v1 secret only'
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# Second row, provisioned the same way, that 'rotate_and_login' will
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# deliberately leave untouched - the row this whole scenario is about.
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stranded_body = URI.encode_www_form(
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'user[email]' => STRANDED_EMAIL, 'user[password]' => PASSWORD,
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'user[password_confirmation]' => PASSWORD, 'authenticity_token' => token
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)
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stranded_signup = http.post('/users', stranded_body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected the stranded user's sign-up to redirect, got #{stranded_signup.code}" unless stranded_signup.code == '302'
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raise 'expected to find the stranded user right after signing up' unless User.find_by(email: STRANDED_EMAIL)
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puts 'signup: second user provisioned under v1 too - rotate_and_login will deliberately never touch this one'
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end
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when 'rotate_and_login'
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Net::HTTP.start('127.0.0.1', port) do |http|
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home = http.get('/')
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cookie = cookie_from(home)
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token = csrf_token_from(home.body)
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# The app is now running with v2 as the CURRENT key and v1 only as a
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# previous_keys fallback - this row has never been touched since
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# 'signup' wrote it under v1, so finding it at all here is the real
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# proof that Encryption.decrypt_with_rotation's fallback (and
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# encrypt_for_query's multi-candidate IN-list) both work over a real
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# request cycle, not just against a fixture in a unit test.
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login_body = URI.encode_www_form('user[email]' => EMAIL, 'user[password]' => PASSWORD, 'authenticity_token' => token)
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signed_in = http.post('/session', login_body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected sign-in on a still-v1-encrypted row to succeed via previous_keys, got #{signed_in.code}" unless signed_in.code == '302'
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cookie = cookie_from(signed_in)
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edit_page = http.get('/account/edit', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected the account edit page to render, got #{edit_page.code}" unless edit_page.code == '200'
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edit_token = csrf_token_from(edit_page.body)
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# Changing the email is what actually forces a fresh Encryption.encrypt
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# call (the setter's no-op guard only skips re-encrypting when the
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# plaintext is unchanged) - the natural way a real user's row gets
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# migrated onto the new key, exactly as Prism::Orm::Encryption's own
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# comments describe ("any row that gets explicitly re-saved").
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update_body = URI.encode_www_form('user[email]' => EMAIL_AFTER_UPDATE, '_method' => 'PATCH', 'authenticity_token' => edit_token)
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updated = http.post('/account', update_body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected the account update to redirect, got #{updated.code}" unless updated.code == '302'
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user = User.find_by(email: EMAIL_AFTER_UPDATE)
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raise 'expected to find the user by their new plaintext email right after updating it' unless user
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row = Prism::Orm.store.find(:users, user.id)
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ciphertext = row['email']
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v2_plaintext = decrypts_under?(V2_SECRET, ciphertext)
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raise "expected the re-saved row to now decrypt under v2, got #{v2_plaintext.inspect}" unless v2_plaintext == EMAIL_AFTER_UPDATE
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raise 'expected the re-saved row NOT to decrypt under the retired v1 secret anymore' if decrypts_under?(V1_SECRET, ciphertext)
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puts 'rotate_and_login: signed in via the v1 fallback, updated the email, row now migrated onto v2 only'
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# Deliberately NOT touched here: the stranded user's row stays exactly
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# as 'signup' left it, still encrypted under v1 only, still findable
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# right now only because this phase still carries v1 in previous_keys.
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raise 'expected the stranded user to still be reachable during the transition window' unless User.find_by(email: STRANDED_EMAIL)
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puts 'rotate_and_login: stranded user deliberately left untouched (still v1-only on disk)'
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end
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when 'post_rotation_final'
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Net::HTTP.start('127.0.0.1', port) do |http|
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home = http.get('/')
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cookie = cookie_from(home)
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token = csrf_token_from(home.body)
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# v1 has been fully retired (PRISM_BLOG_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_SECRETS is
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# unset for this phase) - the migrated row from 'rotate_and_login' must
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# still authenticate on v2 alone, proving the cutover is safe to
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# complete once every row has actually been re-saved.
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login_body = URI.encode_www_form('user[email]' => EMAIL_AFTER_UPDATE, 'user[password]' => PASSWORD, 'authenticity_token' => token)
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signed_in = http.post('/session', login_body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected sign-in on the fully-migrated row to succeed with v1 fully retired, got #{signed_in.code}" unless signed_in.code == '302'
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puts 'post_rotation_final: migrated user still signs in with v1 completely retired (no previous_keys configured)'
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# The risk this whole scenario documents: cutting v1 over BEFORE every
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# row has actually been re-saved locks out whoever was never migrated.
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# find_by can't even locate the stranded row anymore - encrypt_for_query
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# only has v2 to build candidate ciphertext with, so it builds the WRONG
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# ciphertext for a still-v1 row and the deterministic lookup just misses
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# (an ordinary index miss, not a raised error) - which surfaces to the
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# user as an ordinary "invalid credentials" rejection, not a crash.
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stranded_login_body = URI.encode_www_form('user[email]' => STRANDED_EMAIL, 'user[password]' => PASSWORD, 'authenticity_token' => token)
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stranded_login = http.post('/session', stranded_login_body, 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie' => cookie)
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raise "expected the stranded (never-migrated) user's login to be rejected as invalid credentials, got #{stranded_login.code}" unless stranded_login.code == '422'
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raise 'expected the stranded login rejection page to actually explain why' unless stranded_login.body.include?('Invalid email or password')
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# Independent proof of exactly WHY it failed: the row on disk never
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# moved off v1 (nobody re-saved it during the transition window), and
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# v2 alone genuinely cannot read it - scanned directly off the store
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# (find_by can't be used here, that's precisely the query path that
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# just failed above for the same reason).
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stranded_row = Prism::Orm.store.all(:users).find { |row| decrypts_under?(V1_SECRET, row['email']) == STRANDED_EMAIL }
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raise 'expected the stranded row to still be findable by scanning raw ciphertext under v1' unless stranded_row
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raise 'expected the stranded row to NOT decrypt under v2 (this is the whole point: it was never re-saved)' if decrypts_under?(V2_SECRET, stranded_row['email'])
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puts 'post_rotation_final: stranded (never-migrated) user correctly locked out after full cutover - ' \
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'confirmed the row is genuinely still v1-only on disk, not a false negative'
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# The login rejection above is a SILENT miss (encrypt_for_query builds
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# the wrong ciphertext candidate and the lookup just finds nothing, an
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# ordinary "invalid credentials" 422). Reading the same row's `.email`
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# directly - by primary key, not through the encrypted-attribute query
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# path - is a genuinely different failure shape: `find` never touches
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# ciphertext (it looks up by plain `id`), so the row loads fine, and it
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# is only the `encrypts :email` reader itself that has no key left to
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# try (current v2 fails, and previous_keys is empty with v1 fully
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# retired) - `decrypt_with_rotation` re-raises the original
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# Encryption::Error instead of returning nil or garbage. Documents the
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# contrast on purpose: a query silently sees nothing, a direct read
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# loudly blows up.
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stranded_user = User.find(stranded_row['id'])
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begin
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stranded_user.email
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raise 'expected reading .email directly on a fully-retired-key row to raise Encryption::Error, it did not raise at all'
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rescue Prism::Orm::Encryption::Error
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puts 'post_rotation_final: direct .email read on the stranded row raised Encryption::Error as expected ' \
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'(no key left that can decrypt it), unlike the silent find_by miss above'
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end
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end
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else
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raise "unknown phase #{phase.inspect} (expected signup, rotate_and_login, or post_rotation_final)"
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end
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server.stop
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