diff --git a/examples/blog/app.rb b/examples/blog/app.rb
index df671bf..98ae225 100644
--- a/examples/blog/app.rb
+++ b/examples/blog/app.rb
@@ -1,23 +1,166 @@
 require 'prism'
+require 'fileutils'
 
 APP_ROOT = __dir__
 
-Prism::Orm.connect(File.join(APP_ROOT, 'db', 'development.pstore'))
+# Both overridable by ENV so a second, independent OS process (see
+# rotation_worker.rb) can boot this exact app against its own scratch
+# database and its own encryption secret without touching development.pstore
+# - key rotation genuinely retires the OLD secret from the running process'
+# memoized, per-model derived keys, so exercising it for real needs a fresh
+# `ruby` invocation, not just a different in-process config call.
+DB_DIR = ENV.fetch('PRISM_BLOG_DB_DIR', File.join(APP_ROOT, 'db'))
+FileUtils.mkdir_p(DB_DIR)
+
+Prism::Orm.connect(File.join(DB_DIR, 'development.pstore'))
 Prism::Orm.migrator(File.join(APP_ROOT, 'db', 'migrate')).migrate!
 
+Prism::Jobs.default_queue = Prism::Jobs::Queue.new(File.join(DB_DIR, 'jobs.pstore'))
+Prism::Mailer.delivery_method = :test
+
+# PStoreStore instead of the default in-memory RateLimiter::MemoryStore -
+# throttle windows and fail2ban-style bans survive a process restart the
+# same way development.pstore/jobs.pstore already do. Without this, an
+# attacker who gets banned right before a deploy (a plain process restart)
+# would find the ban silently gone the moment the new process comes up,
+# since MemoryStore keeps every window and ban only in that one process'
+# RAM. See blog_rate_limit_worker.rb for the two-process proof.
+Prism::RateLimiter.store = Prism::RateLimiter::PStoreStore.new(File.join(DB_DIR, 'rate_limits.pstore'))
+
+Prism::I18n.default_locale = :en
+Prism::I18n.load_path << File.join(APP_ROOT, 'config', 'locales')
+Prism::I18n.load_translations!
+
+LOG_DIR = File.join(APP_ROOT, 'log')
+Dir.mkdir(LOG_DIR) unless Dir.exist?(LOG_DIR)
+DEVELOPMENT_LOG = File.open(File.join(LOG_DIR, 'development.log'), 'a')
+DEVELOPMENT_LOG.sync = true
+Prism::Instrumentation::LogSubscriber.attach(
+  DEVELOPMENT_LOG,
+  patterns: %w[sql.prism render_template.prism process_action.prism perform_job.prism deliver_mail.prism]
+)
+
 Prism::Controller.views_root(File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'views'))
 Prism::Controller.layout(:application)
 
 Dir[File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'models', '*.rb')].sort.each { |file| require file }
+Dir[File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'mailers', '*.rb')].sort.each { |file| require file }
+Dir[File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'policies', '*.rb')].sort.each { |file| require file }
+Dir[File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'channels', '*.rb')].sort.each { |file| require file }
+# application_controller.rb has to load before every other controller
+# (they all subclass it) - a plain alphabetical sort no longer guarantees
+# that on its own now that account_controller.rb sorts ahead of it.
+require File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'controllers', 'application_controller.rb')
 Dir[File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'controllers', '*.rb')].sort.each { |file| require file }
 
+# req.path is the raw PATH_INFO - the router only strips a trailing
+# ".json" (etc) internally while matching, so without stripping it here
+# too a POST to /session.json would silently dodge this throttle
+# entirely (same account, same IP, just a different extension).
+def throttled_path(req, base)
+  req.path.sub(%r{\.[^./]+\z}, '') == base
+end
+
+Prism::RateLimiter.throttle('logins/ip', limit: 5, period: 60) do |req|
+  throttled_path(req, '/session') && req.request_method == 'POST' ? req.env['REMOTE_ADDR'] : nil
+end
+
+Prism::RateLimiter.throttle('signups/ip', limit: 3, period: 60) do |req|
+  throttled_path(req, '/users') && req.request_method == 'POST' ? req.env['REMOTE_ADDR'] : nil
+end
+
+# Same shape as signups/ip above, same reason: #create's response is
+# identical whether or not the email exists (see the comment on
+# PasswordResetsController#create), but without a limit here that endpoint
+# would still let an attacker hammer arbitrary addresses with reset emails
+# for free.
+Prism::RateLimiter.throttle('password_resets/ip', limit: 3, period: 60) do |req|
+  throttled_path(req, '/password_resets') && req.request_method == 'POST' ? req.env['REMOTE_ADDR'] : nil
+end
+
+# Same shape and reason as password_resets/ip above: #create's response is
+# identical whether or not the address exists or is already confirmed, but
+# without a limit here that endpoint would let an attacker hammer arbitrary
+# addresses with confirmation emails for free.
+Prism::RateLimiter.throttle('email_confirmations/ip', limit: 3, period: 60) do |req|
+  throttled_path(req, '/email_confirmations') && req.request_method == 'POST' ? req.env['REMOTE_ADDR'] : nil
+end
+
+# Two separate rules on purpose: the .json API is meant to be embeddable
+# by anyone (a "latest posts" widget on a third-party site), but only the
+# trusted admin dashboard origin gets to write through it, and only that
+# origin is allowed to send the session cookie cross-origin at all. The
+# specific origin is registered FIRST - Prism::Cors.resource_for returns
+# the first rule whose origin matches, and '*' matches every origin, so a
+# wildcard rule ahead of this one would shadow it for every request.
+Prism::Cors.configure do |config|
+  config.allow do
+    origins 'https://admin.blog-demo.internal'
+    resource '/posts', methods: %w[GET POST], headers: %w[Content-Type X-CSRF-Token], credentials: true
+    resource '/posts/*', methods: %w[GET PATCH DELETE], headers: %w[Content-Type X-CSRF-Token], credentials: true
+  end
+
+  config.allow do
+    origins '*'
+    resource '/posts', methods: %w[GET]
+    resource '/posts/*', methods: %w[GET]
+  end
+end
+
 class Blog < Prism::Application
   set :views, File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'views')
-  enable_sessions(secret: 'blog-demo-secret')
+  enable_sessions(
+    secret: ENV.fetch('PRISM_BLOG_SESSION_SECRET', 'blog-demo-secret'),
+    previous_secrets: ENV['PRISM_BLOG_SESSION_PREVIOUS_SECRETS'].to_s.split(',')
+  )
+  enable_attribute_encryption(
+    secret: ENV.fetch('PRISM_BLOG_ENCRYPTION_SECRET', 'blog-demo-encryption-secret'),
+    previous_secrets: ENV['PRISM_BLOG_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_SECRETS'].to_s.split(',')
+  )
+  # Backs User.generates_token_for(:password_reset) - a separate secret
+  # (own ENV var, own rotation list) from both session and encryption above
+  # on purpose: retiring this one to kill every outstanding reset link
+  # (say, right after the leak a rotation is usually responding to) should
+  # never force-log-out every signed-in visitor or break decryption of
+  # already-encrypted columns as a side effect.
+  enable_token_signing(
+    secret: ENV.fetch('PRISM_BLOG_TOKEN_SECRET', 'blog-demo-token-secret'),
+    previous_secrets: ENV['PRISM_BLOG_TOKEN_PREVIOUS_SECRETS'].to_s.split(',')
+  )
+  enable_assets(source: File.join(APP_ROOT, 'app', 'assets'), output: File.join(APP_ROOT, 'public', 'assets'))
   use Prism::Middleware::Logger
+  use Prism::Middleware::Compression
+  use Prism::Middleware::Cors
   use Prism::Middleware::ParamsParser
+  use Prism::Middleware::RateLimiting
   use Prism::Middleware::Static, root: File.join(APP_ROOT, 'public')
 
+  # Log-only by default so a detected N+1 shows up in the dev log the same
+  # way Bullet would, without ever turning an otherwise fine response into a
+  # 500 - this app's controllers already lean hard on .includes (see
+  # PostsController#index/#show) specifically to avoid the pattern this
+  # exists to catch, so in steady state this should stay silent; a warning
+  # here is a real regression, not a false positive.
+  #
+  # PRISM_BLOG_STRICT_N_PLUS_ONE=1 flips raise_on_violation on - meant for
+  # CI/test runs of this demo, where a regression should fail the run
+  # instead of scrolling past in a log nobody re-reads. Application#dispatch
+  # routes a violation through the same handle_uncaught_exception path as
+  # any other bug, so this always surfaces as a normal 500 over real HTTP
+  # (see strict_n_plus_one_demo.rb, which proves that end-to-end against a
+  # deliberately reintroduced N+1 through a real socket).
+  enable_n_plus_one_detection(threshold: 2, raise_on_violation: ENV['PRISM_BLOG_STRICT_N_PLUS_ONE'] == '1')
+  enable_mailer(host: 'localhost', port: 4567)
+  mount '/rails/mailers', Prism::Mailer::PreviewApp.new
+  # PostActivityChannel only ever pushes small JSON control/notification
+  # frames (subscribe acks, comment-count updates) and never acts on
+  # anything a client sends (see #on_message) - 2 KiB is generous headroom
+  # over the largest real payload while still being a meaningfully tighter
+  # cap than Connection::DEFAULT_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE's 16 MiB, so a client
+  # that tries to abuse this read-mostly stream gets cut off quickly
+  # instead of being allowed to buffer up to the library-wide default.
+  websocket '/cable', PostActivityChannel, max_message_size: 2048
+
   root(to: 'posts#index')
   resources :posts, only: %i[index show create]
 end